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ABSTRACT. In 1907, Canadian Senator P. Poirier suggested dividing the Arctic into sectors belonging to the Arctic rim states.
Canada in 1925 and the Soviet Union in 1926 established legislation based on this sectoral concept. The 1926 Decree of the USSR
on the Arctic sector was interpreted in different ways by Soviet legal writers. State practice of the Soviet Union concerning the
Arctic sector was more or less consistent. However, the attitude to the Arctic sector of the Russian Federation, as successor to the
USSR in the North, is not quite clear. This article focuses on the doctrinal views and state practice of the Soviet Union and the
Russian Federation relating to the sectoral concept.
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RÉSUMÉ. En 1907, le sénateur canadien P. Poirier a suggéré de diviser l’Arctique en secteurs qui appartiendraient aux États en
bordure de l’Arctique. Le Canada, en 1925, puis l’Union Soviétique, en 1926, ont créé des lois qui s’appuyaient sur ce concept
sectoriel. Le décret de l’URSS de 1926 sur le secteur arctique a été interprété différemment par les rédacteurs juridiques de l’Union
Soviétique. La manière de procéder de cet État, en ce qui concerne le secteur arctique, a été plus ou moins cohérente. L’attitude
de la Fédération de Russie (qui a succédé à l’URSS dans le Nord) envers le secteur arctique n’est cependant pas très claire. Cet
article se penche sur les vues doctrinales et le protocole d’État de l’Union Soviétique et de la Fédération de Russie en ce qui a trait
à ce concept sectoriel.
Mots clés: Arctique, Russie, droit international, concept sectoriel
Traduit pour la revue Arctic par Nésida Loyer.
INTRODUCTION
In 1907 Canadian Senator P. Poirier, to protect the rights
of Canada in the Arctic, made a long speech in which he
proposed the following:
a country whose possession today goes up to the Arctic
regions will have a right, or should have a right, or has
a right, to all the lands that are to be found in the waters
between a line extending from its eastern extremity
north, and another line extending from the western
extremity north. All the lands between the two lines up
to the North Pole should belong and do belong to the
country whose territory abuts up there. (Canada, Senate
Debates, 1907:271; cited in Pharand, 1988:10)
Thus, Senator Poirier put the first brick in the foundation
of the concept of sectoral division of the Arctic. By that time,
the Canadian Department of the Interior had already pub-
lished two maps—Explorations in Northern Canada and
Adjacent Portions of Greenland and Alaska (1904) and Atlas
of Canada No.1, Territorial Divisions (1906)—that used the
141st and 60th meridians as the Canadian boundaries. The
first map extended those boundaries up to the North Pole, the
second one as far north as necessary to include all of the
northernmost islands (Pharand, 1988). Nevertheless, Sir R.
Cartwright, the representative of the Canadian government in
the Senate who got the floor after Poirier’s speech, did not
support the senator’s sectoral initiative (Pharand, 1988).
Later the Canadian government changed its position
concerning the sectoral concept.
LEGISLATION
On 1 June 1925 the Canadian Parliament discussed an
amendment to the Northwest Territories Act that required
scientists and explorers who intended to work in the
Northwest Territories to get licenses and permits. Minister
of the Interior C. Stewart, who introduced the amendment
in the Parliament, claimed Canadian sovereignty up to the
North Pole (Pharand, 1988).
The adoption of the amendment had an interesting
significance: it showed that until 1925, the Northwest
Territories actually had been a territory for the common
use, open to scientists and explorers from other countries.
On 19 July 1926 a Canadian order-in-council establish-
ing the Arctic Islands Preserve was adopted, which used
the sector configuration for the northern part of the Pre-
serve. The same configuration was laid down in another
order-in-council adopted on 15 May 1929, which intro-
duced new game regulations (Pharand, 1988).
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The Soviet Union followed the Canadian path. On 15
April 1926 the Central Executive Committee of the USSR
issued a Decree that stated:
All lands and islands, both discovered and which may
be discovered in the future, which do not comprise at
the time of publication of the present decree the territory
of any foreign state recognized by the Government of
the USSR, located in the northern Arctic Ocean, north
of the shores of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
up to the North Pole between the meridian 32˚04'35" E.
long. from Greenwich, running along the eastern side
of Vaida Bay through the triangular marker on Cape
Kekurskii, and the meridian 168˚49' 30" W. long. from
Greenwich, bisecting the strait separating the Ratmanov
and Kruzenstern Islands, of the Diomede group in the
Bering Sea, are proclaimed to be territory of the USSR.
(Butler, 1978:72; for the original text see Sobranie
Zakonov SSSR, 1926)
The Decree referred directly to the sectoral concept and
claimed only lands and islands inside the sector as Soviet
territory. The eastern limit of the Soviet sector coincided
with the demarcation line defined in the 1867 Boundary
Treaty (Convention on ceding Alaska) between the United
States and Russia (Pharand, 1988). The main aim of the
1867 Treaty was to define the limits of “the territory and
dominion” ceded by Russia to the United States. The
demarcation lines described in the Treaty were not state
boundaries, but a cartographic device to simplify descrip-
tion of the lands concerned in the matter. The same idea
constituted the purport of the Canadian legislation of 1925
and the Soviet decree of 1926 concerning the Arctic
sectors. These acts aimed to prevent scientific and eco-
nomic expansion by other states on lands and islands
within the Arctic sector.
DOCTRINAL VIEWS
The tendency to spread sovereignty over polar territo-
ries emerged early in the 20th century as a reaction to the
ongoing development of international scientific and eco-
nomic activities there. The harshness of climatic condi-
tions prompted some scientists to elaborate new concepts
of acquiring territory so as to avoid the rules of effective
occupation. Probably the most discussed among these
concepts was the sectoral theory.
Soviet scientists provided the greatest support to the
sectoral theory. The most cited among them is V.L.
Lakhtine, who published in 1928 a monograph entitled
Prava na severnye polyarnye prostranstva (Rights over
the Arctic Regions). The author based his views on the
Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle and the ex-
pansionist character of imperialism. He wrote: “The So-
viet Union has considerable interests beyond the Arctic
Circle that completely correspond to international law. In
contrast to those of other countries, these interests are
quite legal and determined by both strategic defence con-
siderations, a wish to secure its northern coast from the
possible offense of an enemy, and economic considera-
tions” (Lakhtine, 1928:14 – 15). According to Lakhtine,
these circumstances played the prime role in the adoption
of the 1926 Decree.
In this case, what were the legal consequences of the
sectoral division of the Arctic? Lakhtine considered that
all lands and islands, both discovered and undiscovered,
regardless of who effectively occupied them, had to be
under the sovereignty of the owner of a sector in accord-
ance with the principle of “rayona tyagoteniya” or “region
of attraction.” (The English version of this notion was
given in Lakhtine, 1930:705). This principle is no more
than a modification of the contiguity theory.
According to Lakhtine, undrifted ice should be equated
to the land territory, i.e., be included in the sovereign part
of a sectoral state. Drifted ice and ice-free waters, includ-
ing territorial seas, had to be under the limited sovereignty
of the northern coastal states (Lakhtine, 1928). With re-
spect to air space, Lakhtine came to the conclusion that
“the sovereignty of each sectoral state could be spread
over air space above the whole sectoral region of its
attraction” (Lakhtine, 1928:36). To strengthen his posi-
tion, Lakhtine referred to Professor L. Breitfus, who was
of the opinion that sovereignty by a northern state inside a
sector spread over all spaces (Breitfus, 1927).
Lakhtine’s position is rather controversial. He inter-
preted the provisions of the 1926 Decree quite broadly,
including in the sphere of state sovereignty lands, islands,
undrifted ice, and even the air space above a sector, i.e.,
above the high seas. Lakhtine repeatedly referred to inter-
national law but did not back up his position with any
specific norms and principles of that law. Nevertheless,
some Soviet legal scientists took his interpretation of the
1926 Decree as a point of departure for analyzing the legal
regime of the Arctic, except for Lakhtine’s viewpoint with
respect to air space above a sector.
The first person to interpret the 1926 Decree in a broad
sense was an international lawyer, E.A. Korovin. Answer-
ing a question about the limits of action of the 1926
Decree, Korovin (1926:46) insisted that the term “lands
and islands” had to include also ice blocks and surround-
ing seas. This view was also shared by S.V. Sigrist (1928).
However, the legal adviser to the USSR People’s
Comissariat for Foreign Affairs, A. Sabanin, considered
that the 1926 Decree showed the geographic coordinates
inside which the Soviet Union claimed lands and islands,
whether discovered or not. These demarcation lines did
not mean borders for the polar sector and adoption of the
sector theory (Butler, 1978).
The famous Soviet legal scientist E.B. Pashukanis did
not refer to the sector concept while analyzing the legal
regime of the Arctic. Nevertheless, he regarded as lawful
the 1926 Decree, which was adopted “with the aim to form
the northern borders of the USSR legally [and] precisely”
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(Pashukanis, 1935:127). Pashukanis wrote in particular:
“the polar voyages of our icebreakers, the work of avia-
tion, the opening up of the Northern Sea Route, the organi-
zation of the network of stations and settlements (on Franz
Josef Land, Severnaya Zemlya, Wrangel Island, etc.), the
great and systematic scientific work, all these facts [pro-
vide] evidence about rather effective occupation by the
Soviet Union of the adjacent polar areas” (Pashukanis,
1935:127). He stressed the necessity of effective occupa-
tion for acquiring polar areas but not the sectoral theory.
However, what the term “polar areas” means remained
uncertain: was it land territories only, or land and sea
spaces together, or something else?
V.N. Durdenevskiy (1950) considered that all Arctic
states had accepted the sector theory and the necessity of
creating sectors under the full sovereignty of the coastal
states. V.I. Lisovskiy (1969) expressed the view that all
polar states had a sector in the Arctic; but only islands
within a sector were counted by him as territory of an
Arctic state.
Authors of monographs and textbooks on international
public law, and articles devoted to the legal regime of the
Arctic published in the USSR in the 1960s, 1970s, and
early 1980s, adhered to similar views: i.e., all Arctic states
had a sector. Further opinions divided mainly into two
groups: a) only islands were territory of a coastal Arctic
state (Kozhevnikov, 1964; Zhudro, 1964; Barabolya et al.,
1966; Ignatenko and Ostapenko, 1978; Modzhoryan and
Blatova, 1979; Tunkin, 1982, 1986); b) both lands and seas
were under the sovereignty of an Arctic state (cf. Uustal,
1958). Zhudro (1964:99) considers in part that “the demar-
cation lines of the sectors are not state boundaries as some
reckon. That is why a polar sector established by one or
another state does not determine a question about the legal
regime of the seas inside it.”
The broad interpretation of the 1926 Decree on the part
of many Soviet authors was connected with their desire to
follow the Marxist-Leninist theory rather than the gener-
ally accepted principles and norms of international law.
This theory stresses the expansionist character of imperi-
alist states and the necessity for socialist states to resist
this trend.
After the Soviet Union signed the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea (CLOS) in 1982, Soviet jurists began to
depart from the Marxist-Leninist theory and rigid political
schemes in their explanation of the institutions and norms
of this branch of international law, adjusting their views
in accordance with generally accepted principles. This
process went ahead rapidly during the perestroika, but not
without contradictions.
For example, B.M. Klimenko (1987) pointed out in
1987 that only islands and archipelagos within the limits of
a sector belonged to a coastal state, being a part of its state
territory. The legal regime of the sea expanses is instead
determined by the norms and principles of the law of the
sea, which may be modified according to the special
conditions of the region.
However, a year later V.N. Kulebyakin (1988) in a
textbook entitled Mezhdunarodnoe morskoe pravo (Inter-
national Maritime Law), using strong political clichés,
cited Korovin and argued that the sectoral states had rights
in the Arctic over both land and sea territories. He consid-
ered that the Arctic sea expanses, because of their special
character, could not be regarded in the same manner as
other sea expanses. To strengthen his position, Kulebyakin
(1988:143) also referred to the provisions of Article 234 of
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This rather
controversial article gives coastal states the right to adopt
and enforce nondiscriminatory laws and regulations for
the prevention, reduction, and control of marine pollution
from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of their
exclusive economic zones (EEZs). But it is doubtful that
this article and the CLOS as a whole contain legal grounds
for the sectoral concept. Kulebyakin’s arguments prob-
ably reflect the inertia of the old style of thinking rather
than the real trends in the development of Soviet legal
science.
The most distinctive feature of these trends, which are
still in progress, is a desire to reevaluate many legal
concepts on objective juridical grounds without help of the
rigid Marxist-Leninist political formulae. A few examples
will serve to illustrate this tendency. R.V. Vartanov and
A.Yu. Roginko wrote in 1990: “Today there is an apparent
need to define more precisely the correlation of the sectoral
principle with the provisions of the contemporary law of
the sea and to reconsider radically the approach to the
whole international legal regime of the Arctic” (Vartanov
and Roginko, 1990:70). It should be noted that the publi-
cations by Molodtsov (1987), Bekyashev et al. (1990), and
Vereshchetin (1992) contained no mention of the Arctic
sectoral concept. In a recent textbook on international law,
there is not even a chapter or paragraph devoted to the
Arctic (Kolosov and Kuznetsov, 1994). Vinogradov (1994)
does mention the Arctic but with respect to the sectoral
concept he states: “The controversial practice of states
does not permit [us] to speak of a norm of the customary
law formed on the basis of the sectoral theory. In this
connection the “narrow” interpretation is preferable, ac-
cording to which the sovereignty of a coastal state may be
spread only over lands and islands but not over the whole
Arctic space adjacent to the shore of the respective state”
(Vinogradov, 1994:380).
These examples indicate that the Soviet/Russian sci-
ence of international law is in the process of reevaluating
the sectoral concept; the jurists trying to be guided by the
generally accepted principles and norms of international
law rather than by political considerations and schemes.
There is no uniformity concerning the sectoral concept
among western legal writers either. The famous French
international lawyer P. Fauchille differentiated between
régions arctiques and régions polaires: effective occupa-
tion could be used to claim sovereignty over régions
arctiques, situated along the Arctic Circle. Régions
polaires, in the central part of the Arctic, consisted of ice
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and therefore were not suitable for settlement, but only for
exploration. This meant that annexation of régions polaires
was not possible. According to Fauchille (1925), these
territories should be in the common possession of all
nations interested in them. Fauchille suggested dividing
the régions polaires among continents on a sectoral basis
for their joint exploration on the part of states of each
continent. He was against the sectoral division of the
Arctic among the circumpolar states only (Fauchille, 1925).
The American jurist D.H. Miller thought that the sectoral
division of the Arctic between the three great northern
states, Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union,
would be very convenient. According to him, the legal
basis for it could be found in the 1825 Russian-British
Treaty about the Bering Sea and the 1867 Russian-Ameri-
can Treaty about the sale of Alaska. Miller (1925:54)
referred to the “hinterland” theory or “territorial propin-
quity.”
In 1926, a British international lawyer, M.F. Lindley,
analyzed the correlation between the sector theory and
hinterland theory. The latter appeared in connection with
the discovery of coastal areas in Africa and claiming their
hinterlands. He concluded that simple geographic contigu-
ity was not a sort of legal right; however, this factor might
have important political consequences; an international
conference could accept the sectoral division in polar
regions (Lindley, 1926:235).
The Norwegian author G. Smedal (1931:64) wrote:
“The sector principle is not a legal principle having a title
in the law of nations.” He considered that a no-man’s-land
had to be acquired by occupation, or might be placed under
the sovereignty of a single state in accordance with an
international agreement.
A similar attitude to the sectoral theory was articulated
by M.W. Mouton. He underlined that although the sectoral
concept might be practical and convenient, it went “against
all previously recognized methods of acquisition of terri-
torial sovereignty, however relaxed with regard to Polar
regions” (Mouton, 1963:243). Dr. Mouton criticized the
principle of contiguity as a basic element of the sectoral
concept, referring to the Island of Palmas arbitration of
April 1928. To him, the sector theory is neither a generally
accepted doctrine of international law nor a recognized
method of acquisition of territorial sovereignty (Mouton,
1963).
Probably the most profound research on the sectoral
theory was done by the authoritative Canadian interna-
tional jurist, D. Pharand. He analyzed all aspects of the
theory: its origin, boundary treaties, customary law, and
contiguity as a basis for it. He arrived at the following
conclusion: “The 1825 and 1867 boundary treaties cannot
serve as a legal basis for the sector theory...Contiguity is
incapable of serving as a legal basis for the sector
theory…The sector theory has not developed as a principle
of customary law” (Pharand, 1988:26, 43, 79). In other
words, there are no legal grounds for the sectoral concept
in the Arctic.
The above opinions lead us to conclude that doctrinal
views concerning the sectoral concept differ greatly.
STATE PRACTICE
In contrast to the Soviet doctrinal views relating to the
sector concept, state practice of the Soviet Union was
rather consistent. First of all, it is necessary to underline
that the USSR had never officially laid claim to the waters
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction within its sector.
The American practice of entering the Soviet sector with
warships in 1957, 1963 – 65, and 1967 illustrates this well
(Butler, 1978).
In 1937, the Soviet Union commenced its vast pro-
gramme of using ice islands as drifting scientific stations.
For decades, the ice stations crisscrossed the Arctic Ocean,
entering the sectors of all Arctic states (Prokhorov, 1976).
This circumstance proves that the USSR did not consider
the limits of the Arctic sectors as state boundaries.
The negotiations between the Soviet Union (and now
Russia) and Norway concerning the delimitation of the
continental shelf and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in
the Barents Sea, in progress since 1974, are related to the
sectoral concept. The Soviet Union insisted on the recog-
nition of the sector concept as a special circumstance for
the region, considering that the delimitation line should
coincide with the western limit of the Soviet sector, i.e.,
the meridian 32˚04' 35" E. longitude (Molodtsov, 1982;
Østreng, 1986).
The same position was taken by the USSR during the
negotiations with the United States on a similar problem in
the Chukchi Sea in 1980 – 90 (Ivanov, 1992). Unlike the
Barents Sea case, the Soviet Union and the United States
signed an agreement concerning the delimitation between
them of the continental shelf and EEZs in the Chukchi and
Bering Seas on 1 July 1990. The delimitation line in the
Chukchi Sea coincides with the eastern limit of the Soviet
sector. Article 1(1) of this agreement states: “The Parties
agree that the line described as the ‘western limit’ in
Article 1 of the 1867 Convention, as defined in Article 2 of
this Agreement, is the maritime boundary between the
United States and the Soviet Union” (International Legal
Materials, 1990:941 – 945). It seems that the USSR used
the sector lines in both cases as a convenient way to delimit
the sea expanses in this region and take into consideration
its economic and strategic interests.
On 1 October 1987 in Murmansk, the Soviet leader M.S.
Gorbachev delivered a speech devoted chiefly to the prob-
lems of the Arctic and their solution (Pravda, 2 October
1986). The world’s mass media called this speech “the
Murmansk Initiative” of the Soviet Union because it con-
tained a series of wide-ranging proposals for regional
security and cooperation in the Arctic, which marked a real
breakthrough in the Soviet approach to this region. For
the first time in several decades, the USSR decided to
lift the “iron curtain” over its Arctic areas and called for
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international cooperation in many fields in the North. The
Murmansk initiative did not touch the Arctic sectoral
concept directly, but it definitely influenced the process of
seeking new approaches to this concept on the part of the
Soviet state bodies and legal scientists.
Despite radical changes in Soviet political thinking
during the perestroika, according to E. Franckx (1992),
there were some doubts concerning the official Soviet
position with respect to the Arctic sector. Franckx refers to
the Annex to Issue 1 of the 1986 Notices to Mariners,
which contained a chapter entitled “Legal Acts and Regu-
lations of the USSR State Organs on Questions of Naviga-
tion.” The chapter included the 1926 Decree “On the
Proclamation of Lands and Islands Located in the North-
ern Arctic Ocean as Territory of the USSR.” In this con-
nection Franckx (1992:372) writes: “The inclusion of the
sector decree in a maritime law context is somewhat
unusual and even inappropriate, unless it is indicative of
the fact that the sector still serves a purpose in Soviet
maritime law.”
It is rather difficult to agree with Franckx, because all
lands and islands have a belt of territorial waters. In 1986
the Soviet Union controlled the navigation of foreign
warships in its territorial seas. The main idea of publishing
the 1926 Decree in the Annex to Issue 1 of the Notices to
Mariners of 1986 was to focus attention on this circum-
stance—in other words, to defend Soviet national interests
in the territorial waters of the Arctic islands. Nevertheless,
Franckx is quite right about the lack of clarity in Soviet
policy; even today, after the collapse of the USSR, the
official position of its successor—the Russian Federa-
tion—relating to the sector concept is still not clear.
However, some recent events may indicate the attitude
of the Russian Federation to the Arctic sectoral concept.
For example, during incidents between Russian and Ameri-
can submarines off the Kola Peninsula in February 1992
and March 1993, Russian commentators did not refer to
the sector theory, nor did the government use the theory in
its response to the incidents (Komsomol’skaya pravda, 21
March 1992; Izvestiya, 23 March 1993). A letter of 16
October 1992 from V. Mikhaylichenko, Chief of the Ad-
ministration of the Northern Sea Route, to Mr. Kuieken,
Master of the motor vessel Solo, concerning the sailing of
the Greenpeace vessel along seaways of the Northern Sea
Route stated:
We would like to draw your attention to the fact that the
Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the
Northern Sea Route were officially published in Notices
to Mariners No. 29 on July 13, 1991.
To obtain permission for the navigation of your
vessel Solo along the seaways of the Northern Sea
Route, you had to send a request to the Administration
of the Northern Sea Route...
You would have obtained the permission for
navigating along the Northern Sea Route, the date, the
area of navigation, and the conditions of the ice pilotage
after the expert examination of your vessel to define her
correspondence to the Requirements for the Design,
Equipment, and Supply of Vessels Navigating the
Northern Sea Route.
Please note that the permission for navigating along
the Northern Sea Route does not give the right to
conduct any scientific research, tourism, or fishing in
the Russian Arctic. For these purposes, you should
send a request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation.
Presently only the transit of foreign vessels along
the Northern Sea Route is possible (or sailing to the
port of Igarka), because the Russian Arctic ports (except
Igarka) are not open to foreign vessels.
You entered the seaways of the Northern Sea Route
without the mentioned permission, which was a violation
of the Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of
the Northern Sea Route, in particular Regulations 3, 4,
and 7. According to the Edict of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 26, 1984
(which is still in force) “On the Strengthening of the
Protection of Nature in the Extreme North and Marine
Areas Adjacent to the Northern Coast of the USSR”
and articles 3 and 14 (of this Edict) you may be fined.
(The letter was obtained by the author from the
Department of Merchant Marine of the Russian Ministry
of Transport on 27 June 1995)
Note that there is no reference to the sectoral Decree of
1926 in this letter.
An article in Izvestiya was devoted to President Yeltsin’s
plan to organize principally new international routes in
airspace above the North Pole and the Arctic Ocean, which
had been tightly closed by the missile shield for decades.
This article calls the 1926 Decree, which established “the
polar possessions of the USSR” as “the famous funny
paper” (Bocharov, 1995). Taking into consideration these
facts, it is possible to conclude that a revision of the Arctic
sector concept is occurring in Russian governmental struc-
tures as well.
It would be appropriate for the governments of Russia
and Canada to clarify their attitude to the Arctic sectoral
concept by political and legal means, taking into consid-
eration new trends in the development of international
relations in the world as a whole and in the Arctic in
particular.
SUMMARY
Only two northern states, Canada and Russia (earlier
the Soviet Union) rely on the sector concept in their state
practice in the Arctic.
The position of Canada, the initiator of the Arctic
sectoral concept, is rather controversial. On the one hand,
there is much evidence of Canadian claims over only the
Arctic islands on the grounds of the sector concept. On the
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other hand, sometimes Canada has tried to spread its rights
over the sea expanses within the Canadian sector. The
official attitude of Canada to this matter is not absolutely
clear even now.
The Soviet Union in its 1926 Decree proclaimed only
lands and islands in the limits of the Soviet sector as a part
of state territory. The USSR took the delimitation line of
the 1867 Boundary Treaty between the United States and
Russia as the eastern limit of the Arctic sector. There was
no evidence that the Soviet Union used the sector theory to
spread its sovereignty over the sea areas. The Soviet Union
(now Russia) has never considered the limits of the Arctic
sector as national boundaries. Nevertheless, the eastern
and western limits of the Soviet sector were used by the
USSR at the negotiations with the United States and
Norway concerning the delimitation of the continental
shelf and EEZs. The western delimitation line of the 1867
Treaty was used to delimit the continental shelf and EEZs
between the United States and the Soviet Union in the
Chukchi Sea in the 1990 Soviet-American Agreement on
the maritime boundary delimitation in the Chukchi and
Bering Seas. In this connection, it is possible to conclude
that the 1867 Treaty and the 1990 Agreement give some
legal grounds for the sectoral concept. However, the basic
element of the concept—the theory of contiguity—does
not accord with international law. It seems that the Soviet
Union used the sector lines at the negotiations with Nor-
way and in the agreement with the United States as a
convenient way to delimit the sea expanses.
In the 1920s, Canada and the Soviet Union adopted the
sectoral acts in order to prevent economic and scientific
expansion on the part of other states in the land areas
adjacent to their northern coasts. According to Fogelson
(1992:162), by 1930, despite the lack of recognition by the
United States, “the Arctic was effectively divided into
sectors extending around the Arctic Circle and encom-
passing an area from the subarctic to the North Pole.”
The position relating to the sector concept of the succes-
sor to the Soviet Union in the Arctic, the Russian Federa-
tion, is not clear. There are some signs that Russia is
reviewing this policy.
The establishment of sectoral legislation by the Soviet
Union in the concrete historical circumstances of the
1920s was more or less understandable. However, the
world has changed significantly since that period. Now the
world needs cooperative rather than divided efforts of all
states in political, economic, social, scientific, and eco-
logical spheres to procure sustainable development in the
Arctic. That is why it is necessary to revise and clarify the
attitude of the Russian Federation (as well as Canada) to
the sector concept, taking into consideration this aim.
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